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Todd Bauer and Jason Hamlet | Sandia National Laboratories P hysical unclonable functions (PUFs) make use of the measurable intrinsic randomness of physical systems to establish signatures for those systems. A PUF is like a fingerprint or biometric for a physical object where each instantiation of that object has its own unique PUF response. This response differs significantly from all other instantiations of the object, but a single object has little variation from one measurement to the next. A PUF can be based on measurements of a wide variety of physical parameters, but PUFs extracted from measurements of integrated circuits are particularly useful because the output is easily incorporated into computational operations. With this primer, we provide an introduction to some common PUF circuit designs and approaches for generating PUF responses and their applications, and we identify some open research problems.
PUF Circuit Designs
Consider a production run of "identical" integrated circuits (ICs), each of which is equipped with a PUF. If we choose one of the ICs and repeatedly measure its PUF, we will obtain almost the same response each time.
However, if we then select a second IC and measure its PUF, we will find that its response is much different from the first IC's response.
The earliest work on the use of physical variations for authentication occurred in the 1980s. 1,2 These early systems suggested that the stochastic (random) physical arrangement of small optical fibers within a material, such as currency, could be used to authenticate that material. Nearly 20 years later, the first electronic circuit designs aimed at exploiting manufacturing variations in microelectronics appeared, initiating an intense interest in PUFs. 3 Two well-known electronic PUFs are the arbiter and ring oscillator PUF (ROPUF) designs. 4 Both of these designs exploit unique variations in the propagation delays through interconnects and logic gates. The arbiter PUF, shown in Figure 1a , comprises two identically laid out paths. To measure a response bit from the arbiter, a rising edge is input simultaneously to the two paths. This input signal races through the circuit, and a latch at the output detects which path propagated the input signal faster. For parallel circuits A and B, if A is faster than B, then we assign bit 0. If B is faster than A, then we assign bit 1. By comparing many delay paths, we can generate a bitstream.
The arbiter circuit in Figure 1a shows a multiplexed circuit that optimizes area efficiency via an arbiter that is assembled with stages. For each stage s i , an input challenge bit c[s i ] determines whether the signal paths cross. In this way, 2 n different configurations of the circuit are possible, allowing 2 n bits to be extracted from it. The arbiter PUF requires that its two paths be symmetric, which can be achieved in ICs with manual placement and routing. However, the arbiter PUF is difficult to implement in fieldprogrammable gate arrays (FPGAs) because of the lack of fine control over layout.
The ROPUF, depicted in Figure  1b , is another widely studied design that, although larger than the arbiter PUF, is more suitable for FPGAs. Like the arbiter PUF, the ROPUF also exploits variations in propagation delays to generate response bits. In this PUF, delay variations manifest as differences in the oscillation frequencies of identically laid out ring oscillators. Comparing the frequencies from two oscillators allows generation of one PUF bit. A challenge can be input to the multiplexor to select which two oscillators are involved in the comparison.
The static random-access memory (SRAM) PUF is another popular design. 5 Figure 1c shows a simple depiction of an SRAM cell. Applying an input voltage v in to the circuit forces the cell into a stable state. However, with no applied voltage (V a = V b = 0), the cell is unstable. When power is applied, the cell transitions to a stable state with either V a or V b -but not both-at logical 0. This power-on value can be used as a PUF bit. Any SRAM with symmetric cells can be used in this way, provided that the SRAM can be powered on in an uninitialized state.
Generating PUF Responses
PUFs can be divided into two classes: those that have a large, preferably exponential, space of input challenges and those that have perhaps only a single challenge. The arbiter and ROPUF designs have large challenge spaces, whereas the SRAM PUF has a single, fixed challenge.
A typical use for a PUF with a small input space is key generation. In this setting, the PUF's response to a fixed challenge is used as a cryptographic key or as a seed for a key generation algorithm. PUF responses can have noise and can vary with environmental conditions, so using them for key generation often requires use of a fuzzy extractor, which combines error correction with hash-based entropy amplification. The key that results from this process can be used in any application that requires cryptography. 6 PUFs with larger input spaces are often proposed for use in interactive challenge-response protocols. During an enrollment phase, the user chooses a subset of the PUF's large input space and measures the responses to each of these challenges. The challenges and corresponding responses are stored for later use. To authenticate a device containing the PUF, a challenge is selected from the stored database and presented to the PUF. If the PUF's response is close enough to the stored response, the device is deemed authentic. To prevent replay attacks, each challenge should be used only once.
To mitigate privacy concerns associated with using PUFs in a manner that requires storing information in a database maintained by the IC manufacturer, the manufacturer could store a serial number and PUF-derived public key associated with a device. The consumer could then query the manufacturer to determine the authenticity of a purchased product, and then reenroll the PUF to establish a new signature for the device. This would break the link between the PUF and the manufacturer, preventing the manufacturer from tracking the device but also preventing the consumer (original or after resale) from using the PUF to verify the device as authentically manufactured after the re-enrollment. In the case of challenge-response PUFs with a large input space, the user could simply establish a new set of challenge-response pairs that would be unknown to the manufacturer.
In both of these scenarios, the PUF eliminates the need to store secrets on the chip in nonvolatile memory. In PUFs with small input spaces, the secret never has to leave the chip. In the interactive challenge-response use case, the (challenge, response) pairs measured during enrollment must be protected as secrets, but they don't need to be stored on the chip. In both scenarios, the secrets can be measured from the PUF when they're needed, and then erased from volatile memory. This greatly reduces the key's exposure to attackers and is a significant advance in hardware security.
Applications of PUFs
PUFs have been proposed for use in random number generators, 7 remote attestation, 8 protecting intellectual property, 9 and authentication. 10 The utility of PUFs for these applications is dependent on the reliability of the randomness of the PUF output. There are statistical tests for assessing random number generators. 11 While not all of these apply to the relatively short binary strings produced by PUFs, the applicable tests can be used to increase confidence in the randomness of PUF responses. A . Next we concentrate on using PUFs to authenticate ICs for anticounterfeiting protection. Consider that an IC PUF's output is a devicespeci c random binary string with low incidence of collision between any two devices.
ese qualities make the PUF useful as an identier. is identi er is intrinsic to the device's structure and function rather than, for instance, marked on the surface of the package as a serial number might be. e counterfeit electronics market shows us that it's easy to spoof serial numbers, because they're extrinsic features created by processes like screen printing or embossing. PUF outputs, on the other hand, are difcult to spoof, clone, or predict because they're essentially an indirect measurement of uncontrolled variability of the microfabrication processes used to manufacture the IC. For this reason, the utility of a PUF extends beyond identi cation to authentication, where authentication is the rigorous veri cation of identity.
We typically think of access controls in terms of gating human entry into systems and networks, but we can extend the concept of access controls to the supply chain by using PUF-based authentication via a challenge-response protocol to gate acceptance of an IC into the supply chain or into a high-consequence system. e value of this form of authentication is that it can be repeated a er a system is assembled and deployed, or even resold, to ensure that the ICs within it haven't been replaced. is provides protection against counterfeit insertion throughout a system's life cycle.
Challenges and Opportunities
Despite being termed "unclonable functions," there have been some successful modeling and cloning a acks against PUFs. 12, 13 Machinelearning techniques can model simulated ROPUFs and arbiter PUFs with accuracies exceeding the experimental stability of those designs. ese models assume that the a acker has access to many thousands of (challenge, response) pairs, which can be obtained through measurement of a device under the a acker's control or by stealing the list generated during enrollment for training the models. e models can then predict the responses to new challenges. However, it's important to note that a successful a ack on a PUF compromises only that speci c instantiation of the PUF. e a acker must repeat the process to learn the response of the next instantiation of the PUF.
PUFs that don't use an interactive challenge-response mechanism aren't susceptible to these modeling a acks. However, the fuzzy extractors typically employed in such PUFs are subject to sidechannel and template a acks. 14, 15 Researchers have demonstrated the ability to physically clone S M PUFs by using near-infrared emissions to characterize the response of one S M PUF, followed by focused ion beam (FIB) circuit edits to induce the same PUF response in a second circuit. Propagation delays in ring oscillators can also be adjusted with FIB circuit edits, so delay-based PUFs are likely also susceptible to cloning a acks if the adversary can adequately characterize the device to be cloned. 16 Given these vulnerabilities, it's important that researchers continue developing PUFs that are resistant to Subscribe today for the latest in computational science and engineering research, news and analysis, CSE in education, and emerging technologies in the hard sciences. There are also infrastructure challenges. A large company might sell hundreds of millions of ICs per year. If each of these is equipped with a PUF for use in authentication and anti-counterfeiting, then these manufacturers will require an authentication infrastructure capable of supporting billions of devices. Developing, deploying, and maintaining such large-scale infrastructures will present challenges for IC manufacturers, although there are existing public-key infrastructures supporting millions of users. 22 We will also need effective approaches for "rekeying" PUFs. For example, an IC manufacturer may measure some (challenge, response) pairs from a PUF, and the consumer might use one of these to verify the authenticity of a newly purchased IC. However, that user might want to generate a new set of (challenge, response) pairs that can't be known by the manufacturer, which might require altering the PUF in some way. Controlled PUFs might offer a solution to this problem. 23 In the case of a fixed-challenge PUF with a fuzzy extractor, the user can repeat the enrollment process to generate a new key that will be unknown to the manufacturer.
Ensuring the stability of the PUF output over time is another challenge. It's likely that PUF responses will change over time as a result of aging effects such as negative bias temperature instability or electromigration, although little work has been published on the subject. 24 If the impact of aging is small, it can be corrected with fuzzy extractors and it should be possible to detect and mitigate larger, aging-induced changes. 25 Finally, there are opportunities to build standardized security policies around PUFs. Widespread adoption of PUFs could be facilitated by establishing industry standards for authentication and key generation using PUFs. Such standards would expedite common interfaces and utilities for allowing consumers to verify their devices' authenticity and would promote adoption of the technology. This would help to reduce the proliferation of counterfeit electronics in consumer, critical infrastructure, and military systems. 26, 27 P UF technology is poised to become a foundational element of next-generation hardware-oriented security systems. PUFs provide a means to generate unique keys that don't need to be stored in nonvolatile memory, and they offer exciting opportunities for new authentication and supply chain security technologies. A vibrant community has developed around PUFs, which continues to offer opportunities for interesting and useful research on topics including applications, identifying and optimizing sources of entropy, and minimizing noise and deterministic influences.
